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Abstract—Damages caused by spoofed e-mails as sent from a 
bank, a public organization and so on become serious social 
problems. In such e-mails attackers forge the sender address to 
defraud receivers of their personal and/or secret information. As 
a countermeasure against spoofed e-mails, sender domain 
authentication methods such as SPF and DKIM are frequently 
utilized. However, since most spoofed e-mails do not include 
DKIM signature in their e-mail header, those e-mails cannot be 
authenticated by the conventional system. Additionally DKIM 
has a problem that cannot determine whether the attached 
signature is legitimate. In this paper, we propose a method to 
detect spoofed e-mails and alert the user without DKIM 
signature by utilizing DMARC and implement a system that 
sends DMARC verification results to receivers. By utilizing this 
system, the users can obtain alerts for spoofed e-mails that the 
existing systems cannot warn. 
 
Index Terms—Anti spam, DKIM, DMARC, Sender Domain 
Authentication, SPF, Spoofed E-mail  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
-mail communication is one of the most widely used 
service on the Internet. However, various malicious 
usages of e-mail have been becoming a serious social 
problem over the years. For instance, MITM (Man In The 
Middle) attack and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) 
attack are typical abuse examples of e-mail communication. 
In addition, phishing mails, that aim to defraud receivers of 
their personal and/or secret information under the guise of a 
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bank or a public organization and so on, are frequently in 
circulation. Such e-mails are called spoofed e-mails since the 
most senders spoof their addresses or display names. 
Moreover, the damages have been growing by fraud caused 
by spoofed e-mails, therefore many police agencies around 
the world such as the FBI have been alerting [1].  
Sender domain authentication methods have been proposed 
as countermeasure mechanisms against spoofed e-mails. As 
typical sender domain authentication method, SPF (Sender 
Policy Framework) [2] and DKIM (DomainKeys Identified 
Mail) [3] are widely utilized. SPF examines the validity of the 
sending mail server using the IP address. DKIM examines 
whether the message has not been tampered and whether the 
message has sent from proper sender using the digital 
signature. However, since most spoofed e-mails are 
considered to be sent without DKIM signature in the mail 
header, they cannot be verified by DKIM.  
In this paper, we propose a method to distinguish spoofed 
e-mails without DKIM signature by using DMARC 
(Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and 
Conformance) [4]. Although DMARC is utilized for the 
administrator of sender's domain to obtain the aggregate 
report or authentication failure report in general, our system 
notifies the receivers of spoofed e-mail by utilizing DMARC. 
To realize this method, we implemented a system that 
performs sender domain authentication using DMARC, and 
notifies the receiver of the authentication result according to 
the contents of DMARC policy to each receivers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we present existing methods. In Section III, we describe the 
design of our spoofed e-mail alert system. Then, Section IV 
shows an implementation method of the system. Section V 
shows notification examples of DMARC verification results 
and an alert example of an actual received spoofed e-mail. 
Finally, we present concluding remarks and suggestions for 
future study. 
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 II. EXISTING METHODS 
A. Sender Domain Authentication 
Currently, SPF and DKIM have been widely utilized as 
sender domain authentication methods.  
SPF is an authentication method using the IP address of the 
sender's SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) server and 
the domain of Envelope-From address. In order to use the 
verification method, a sender domain publishes an SPF record 
at its own DNS (Domain Name System) server in advance. 
The SPF record indicates the servers that may send messages 
with the sender address of the domain. Then, a receiver 
obtains the sender's SPF record and investigates whether the 
IP address of the sender's SMTP server is included in the SPF 
record. However, SPF has a problem that is not able to 
authenticate forwarded messages properly. This is because 
the IP address of the SMTP server becomes the IP address of 
the relay server rather than that of the original server is used 
for authentication, which does not match the SPF record.  
Secondly, DKIM is a method using digital signature. In 
order to use this method, a sender domain prepares a pair of a 
private key and a public key in advance. Then, the sender 
domain publishes the public key at their DNS server. At the 
time of mail sending, the sender domain creates a digital 
signature from the mail header and the body using the secret 
key, and adds it to the mail header as the DKIM signature. In 
Fig.1, the value of  “b=” tag shows the DKIM signature. 
Then, a receiver queries the public key to the authoritative 
DNS server of sender's domain that obtained from the “d=” 
tag of DKIM signature header. Subsequently the receiver 
compares the hash value obtained from the digital signature 
by using the public key with the hash value, that is the value 
of “bh=” tag. As a result, DKIM verification will be success 
when these values are the same. With such a mechanism, 
unlike SPF, DKIM can verify forwarded messages properly. 
However, DKIM permits even a “d=” tag domain 
(example.net in Fig.1) different from the domain of 
Envelope-From address (example.com in Fig.1). Thus, if a 
spammer sends spoofed e-mails from the address of his/her 
own domain with the DKIM signature, the DKIM verification 
will be success. 
B. DKIM Verification System Using POP Proxy 
Our research group has proposed a system to perform a 
sender domain authentication by DKIM using a POP proxy 
[5]. Although DKIM verification is usually performed by 
mail service provider's server, this system verifies messages 
by using a POP proxy installed by each organization. In 
addition the system reports the verification results to each 
user. Even if the receiving mail server that is operated by 
universities, companies, ISPs, and so on does not support 
DKIM verification, the verification gets available 
independently by introducing this system at each organization. 
In this system, when the proxy receives a retrieval request 
from a mail client, the proxy gets messages from the mail 
server and performs DKIM verification. Then, the proxy puts 
the verification result into the mail header. Based on the 
verification result, proxy or MUA (Mail User Agent), such as 
Outlook, notifies the result to each user. Of course, since this 
system notifies based on DKIM verification result, the system 
cannot perform the verification for the messages without 
DKIM signature. 
C. DMARC 
DMARC is a framework of reporting and declaration of 
policy control using two sender domain authentication 
mechanisms, SPF and DKIM, and that has been spreading 
recently. The reporting function notifies the authentication 
failure reports and the aggregate reports to the administrator 
of the sender's domain. The administrator is able to know 
whether the authentication has been performed as intended by 
this report. On the other hand, in the policy declaration 
function, a sender can specify the e-mails handling method in 
case of sender domain authentication failure. 
In addition, DMARC has the concept of “alignment”. This 
concept means that DMARC verification gets failed even if 
the domain for verification (SPF and DKIM) is different from 
the sender's Header-From domain. SPF and DKIM 
verification need not be the same the Header-From domain 
and Envelope-From domain for SPF or the domain for 
signature for DKIM. Moreover, attackers can spoof the 
Header-From address easily. By taking advantage of 
alignment, a receiver can confirm the validity of the 
Header-From domain. A sender domain can specify the 
strictness of relationships between these domains using 
DMARC record. If a sender specifies “strict” as the alignment, 
DMARC verification will fail unless the domain of the 
Header-From address and the domain for SPF or DKIM 
verification match completely. On the other hand, if a sender 
specifies “relaxed” as the alignment, DMARC verification 
will succeed if the subdomains of the domain are identical. 
In order to use this mechanism, a sender domain needs to 
support SPF and/or DKIM. Additionally, the sender domain 
must publish the DMARC record at its DNS contents server. 




    c=relaxed/relaxed; 
    d=example.net; 
    s=20120113; 
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 verification result reports and indicates the e-mails handling 
method in case of sender domain authentication failure. A 
receiver domain performs sender domain authentication of 
both SPF and DKIM, and applies the policy when the both of 
verifications are failed.  
As mentioned above, a sender domain specifies the 
handling method for the verification-failed messages at the 
“p=” tag of DMARC record as the DNS contents server. 
TABLE I shows the values of “p=” tag and processing details 
corresponding to the each policy. 
For example, let us consider the case where a sender 
domain (example.com) is supporting DMARC. Then, we 
assume that the sender domain is publishing the DMARC 
record as a TXT record of “_dmarc.example.com” in the 
following manner.  
 
v=DMARC1\; p=none\; rua=mailto:reports@example.com 
 
In this example, since the value of “p=” tag is “none”, the 
administrator of example.com requests not to perform the 
isolation or reception rejection of the e-mails even if the 
DMARC verification is failed. Additionally, the administrator 
requests to send the reports to “reports@example.com” as 
shown in the “rua=” tag.  
Fig.2 shows the flow of DMARC verification. 
 
1) A sender domain supports own domain to the SPF 
and/or DKIM. 
2) The sender domain also publishes the DMARC record 
as a TXT record of its DNS contents server. 
3) SPF and DKIM verifier on receiver mail server sends a 
query to the DNS contents server and gets the SPF 
record and the public key for DKIM. Then it performs 
the SPF and the DKIM verification. 
4) SPF and DKIM verifier sends the verification results to 
the DMARC verifier. 
5) DMARC verifier sends a query for DMARC record to 
the DNS contents server of the Header-From domain. 
6) If DMARC verifier obtains the DMARC record, it 
applies the DMARC policy based on the verification 
results of SPF and DKIM, and whether the sender 
domain matches the “alignment”. 
7) DMARC verifier creates an aggregate report containing 
the verification results and the applied policy, and sends 
it to the e-mail address as shown in the “rua=” tag. 
 
TABLE II shows the percentage of each DMARC policy 
based on the number of domains that we have observed. As 
shown in table, since the most of domains' DMARC policies 
are published as “none”, the receiver will accept the 
verification-failed messages without rejection or quarantine. 
We can consider from this survey that many DMARC 
compliant sender domains hope receiver domains to accept 
spoofed messages as are and only to send aggregate reports. 
Hence the isolation or rejection effect of DMARC against 
spoofed e-mails is currently limited. 
III. DESIGN OF DMARC VERIFICATION RESULT 
NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 
A. Summary of the System 
As described in Section II-A and Section II-B, DKIM 
cannot perform the verification for the e-mails that do not 
attach the digital signature. In other words, even if a received 
e-mail is from a domain that should have with a DKIM 
signature, DKIM cannot determine the e-mail that does not 
exist a DKIM signature as spoofed e-mail. To solve the 
problem, we propose a system to warn of such e-mails by 
utilizing DMARC. This system does not focus on creating 
and sending the reports explained in Section II-C. 
Our proposed system performs sender domain 
authentication and notification of DMARC perform on users' 
terminals. By performing on users' terminals, PC users can 
easily adopt the sender domain authentication mechanisms 
and/or DMARC verification even if the user's mail receiving 
server does not support these mechanisms. The system 
obtains the mail receiving server information required for 
SPF from “Received” field of the mail header. After that, the 
system determines the boundary of the internal and external 
organization, and the system uses IP address of the nearest 
TABLE I 
VALUES OF “P=” TAG AND CORRESPONDING HANDLING METHODS 
 
“p=” tag How to Handle failed-messages 
None Inaction even if the authentication failed. 
Quarantine Quarantine the authentication failure mails. 


















(1)Publish the SPF record, public key for DKIM












Result of Sender Domain
Authentication
Query the DMARC record
(3)Verify the mail by SPF or DKIM 
(6)Verify the mail by DMARCSender
Query the SPF record or the public key
Response the SPF record or public key 
TABLE II 







none 1,473 (81.65%) 1,261 (82.31%) 1,821 (77.79%) 
quarantine 123 (6.82%) 93 (6.07%) 209 (8.93%) 
reject 192 (10.64%) 170 (11.10%) 305 (13.03%) 
error 16 (0.89%) 8 (0.52%) 6 (0.26%) 
Total 1,804 (100%) 1,532 (100%) 2,341 (100%) 
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 external organization to the boundary and the e-mail address 
indicated by “Return-Path” for SPF verification. 
SPF and DKIM verification are performed by the 
verification module shown in Fig.3. DMARC verification 
module receives the results of sender domain authentication 
and determines whether to apply the DMARC policy. 
DMARC verification module judges “pass” or “fail” as the 
verification result. Subsequently the system notifies the 
verification result to MUAs. 
B. Summary of the System 
Fig.3 shows the behavior of the POP proxy and a client in 
this system. 
 
1) When the POP proxy received a message acquisition 
command from a MUA, the proxy relays the command 
to the POP server.  
2) The proxy retrieves the information required for 
authentication from the header of the acquired e-mail, 
and inputs the information to the SPF and DKIM 
verification module. 
3) SPF and DKIM verification module performs sender 
domain authentications based on the information 
obtained from the header. 
4) DMARC verification module queries to the sender's 
DNS contents server, and acquires the DMARC record. 
5) DMARC verification module applies the DMARC 
policy based on the result of the sender domain 
authentications. 
6) The proxy adds the DMARC verification result to the 
mail header, and delivers the e-mail to the MUA. 
7) The MUA notifies the user the DMARC verification 
result. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DMARC VERIFICATION 
RESULT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 
Based on the design described in Section II-C, we have 
developed the system using Perl. In order to perform 
DMARC verification, this system is configured by using 
Mail::DMARC and Mail::DMARC::PurePerl [6] that are 
modules published on CPAN. We used MIME::Parser [7] and 
Net::Server::POP3proxySSL, that was created based on 
Net::Server::POP3proxy, to obtain the information required 
for the verification from the mail header. In addition, by 
implementing them all on Cygwin, our proposed system 
works on a user's terminal.  
First, we describe an implementation method of the part to 
obtain the information required for verification from a mail 
header. The parts necessary for verification are Return-Path, 





(1)Send a command 
to receive a mailReceive a mail (2)Retrieve the information for sender domain
authentication from the mail
SPF and DKIM 
verification module (3)Verify the mail by SPF and/or DKIM
DMARC
verification module
(5)Verify the mail by DMARC (6)Add the result to          
the mail header  




(4) Response the DMARC record
Query the DMARC record
Information for Sender
Domain Authentication
Result of Sender 
Domain Authentication
Result of  DMARC Relay the command from the MUA
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Verify the mail and add the results to the mail header
Net::Server::POP3proxySSL
Get a mail from the mail server and
verify the mail in the subroutine
Mail::SPF
Verify the mail by SPF
Mail::DKIM::Verifier








for  DMARC verification
Add the result of DMARC




Verify the mail by DMARC
Mail::DMARC::Result





Notify the result 
in the mail header
Receive a mail




 Fig.4 shows the structure of our proposed system. The 
operation of POP proxy in this system can be divided into 
five of 1) obtaining a message from the POP server, 2) 
analysis of the mail header, 3) execution of the sender domain 
authentication, 4) execution of DMARC verification, 5) 
addition of the verification result. We describe about the 
implementation method for each of these steps. 
 
1) In order to implement the POP proxy and obtain a 
message, we used Net::Server::POP3proxySSL that was 
created based on Net::Server::POP3proxy. This module 
receives a message from the POP server and stores it in 
“$[0]”. By passing the variable to “flterAction” that is a 
subroutine function, this module can perform processing 
on the message. 
2) We used the MIME::Parser for the header of the 
analysis. This module isolates the mail header and the 
body, and extracts the necessary information using 
regular expression. Additionally, the module retrieves 
the sender information to be used for SPF verification 
from the “Received” field. The sender's information 
used for SPF verification is indicated on “Received” 
field the server located in the boundary of the internal 
and external organization is added to the header. Then, 
the system reads the receiving server's data file that 
retains the information of own organization's receiving 
server, and scans “Received” field. By preparing the 
external file, each organization is able to specify the 
receiving server without modifying the program code. 
When the appropriate “Received” field is specified and 
the source IP address is obtained, the module 
terminates. 
3) The system performs SPF verification by using the 
information that was extracted with 2). We utilized Perl 
module Mail::SPF [8] for SPF verification. The system 
performs SPF verification by passing the sender IP 
address and Envelope-From address to this module. On 
the other hand, DKIM need to use the entire message 
for the verification. By passing “$_[0]”, that contains 
the entire message, to Perl module 
Mail::DKIM::Verifier [9], the system performs DKIM 
verification. 
4) By using the information extracted in 2) and the result 
of authentication performing in 3), the system performs 
DMARC verification by Mail::DMARC::PurePerl 
which is a method of Perl module Mail::DMARC. The 
system performs the verification by passing the sender 
IP address, Envelope-From address, Header-From 
address, and verification results of SPF and DKIM to 
Mail::DMARC::PurePerl. 
5) The system appends the DMARC verification result 
obtained in 4) to the mail header, and delivers to the 
MUA. The system receives DMARC verification result 
from DMARC::Mail::Result method. TABLE III shows 
the fields about verification results that are possible to 
obtain by this method. The system adds the verification 
result and Header-From domain regardless of the 
verification result to the mail header. Moreover, when 
the verification result is “fail”, this method can obtain 
the failure reason from “reason” field. Therefore even 
though the verification result was “fail”, this system can 
obtain  “no_policy” as the failure reason from the 
“reason” field when the sender domain was not 
supported DMARC. In addition, as described in Section 
II-C, DMARC is different from DKIM, the verification 
will be failed when the domain indicated by the “d=” 
tag and the domain indicated by the Envelope-From 
address are different. 
The “spf_align” and “dkim_align” field indicates “strict” 
when the header from domain and the domain for each 
verification are completely consistent, and when each of 
these domains is the relationship of the subdomains, the 
field indicates “relaxed”. On the other hand, these fields 
do not have information when DMARC verification 
failed due to these domains are different. 
The system appends the domain of the receiver's e-mail 
address, SPF verification result and Envelope-From, 
DKIM verification result and its signed domain, 
DMARC verification result, and Header-From domain 
to the mail header. Additionally, when the verification 
fails, the system appends the reason. Therefore 
RFC7601[10] allows the freely description in the 
parentheses, the system adds the DMARC policy and 
the reason of verification failure as shown in Fig.5. 
V. NOTIFICATION OF DMARC VERIFICATION RESULT 
We implemented the notification function of DMARC 
verification results by using the label of Microsoft Outlook 
2013 as a user's MUA. The system notifies the four types 
shown in the lower part of the Fig.6 based on DMARC 
TABLE III 
THE FIELDS THAT CAN BE OBTAINED BY MAIL::DMARC::RESULT 
 
Field Contents 
result DMARC verification result. (pass. fail) 
disposition DMARC policy when the result field is “fail”. 
reason The reason of the verification failure when the result 
field is “fail”. 
dkim The result of DKIM verification. 
dkim_align The degree of coincidence with the DKIM signature 
domain and the Header-From domain. 
spf The result of SPF verification. 
spf_align The degree of coincidence with the envelope-From 














  spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sender@example.net; 
  dkim=pass header.d=example.net; 
  dmarc=fail (p=reject comment=no match) 
  header.from=sender@example.com 




 verification result. 
Moreover, Fig.7-10 show the actual label additional 
examples in the MUA. The system appends a blue label when 
succeeding in the verification (Fig.7), and the system adds a 
yellow label when the verification failed and the sender 
domain indicated “none” or “quarantine” as the DMARC 
policy (Fig.8). Furthermore, the system appends an orange 
label when the sender does not correspond to DMARC 
(Fig.9), and the system adds a red label when the verification 
failed and the sender domain indicated “reject” as the 
DMARC policy (Fig.10). 
Additionally, when the applied policy was “reject”, that 
represents such e-mails did not attach the DKIM signature 
even though all of the legitimate transmissions that send from 
the domain are supposed to be attached the signature. 
Otherwise, such e-mails mean that failed to the verification. 
In any case such mails are extremely high possibility of 
spoofing or falsification, therefore the system alerts by 
pop-up window in addition to the red label notification as 
shown in Fig.11. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
In general usage of DMARC, a receiver does not handle 
spoofed e-mails unless the sender's DMARC policy is “reject” 
or “quarantine”. However, as shown in TABLE II, about 80% 
of the DMARC compliant domains publish “none” as the 
policy. Therefore, the existing systems cannot isolate or reject 
the e-mails even if those are very high probability of being 
spam mails. On the other hand, by giving various warnings 
according to each policy, our system enables alerting to 
spoofed e-mails that the conventional systems cannot warn.  
Moreover, since DMARC can be expected to spread more 
widely in the future, the effectiveness of this system will be 
increased. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a system that distinguishes 
spoofed e-mails utilizing DMARC. Our proposed system can 
alert spoofed e-mails that do not attach the DKIM signature 
even though all of the legitimate transmissions that send from 
the domain are supposed to be attached the signature. A 
This mail cannot be verified 
by DMARC verification
The domain of header 
from and for DMARC 
verification are different. 
The sender's domain 





Did fail in DMARC 
verification?
Could be verified 
by DMARC?





Fig. 8.  Addition of “none” Label 
 
Fig. 10.  Addition of “reject” Label 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Pop-up Alert Window 
 
Fig. 7.  Addition of “pass” Label 
Fig. 6.  Flow of the Label Addition 
 




 remarkable point of the system is to implement the all 
functions of sender domain authentication, DMARC 
verification, and the result notification on a user's PC. By 
implementing on each user's PC, users can install a spoofed 
e-mail alert system even if their receiving server does not 
support DMARC verification. Generally DMARC is used for 
administrators of sender domain receives the report of sender 
domain authentication. However, this system is able to alert 
the spoofed e-mails by visually notifying DMARC 
verification result to each recipient. Moreover, even when the 
sender domain was publishing “none” as the DMARC policy, 
our system can prevent a recipient overlooking the spoofed 
e-mails by the notification. 
This system performs sender domain authentication and 
DMARC verification in POP proxy, thus the system is only 
compatible with POP. Therefore e-mail receiving via IMAP 
has been widely utilized in recent years, support of the 
mechanism described in this paper to the IMAP environment 
is a future subject. 
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